Du Toit v Human N.O. and Others (3063/2023) [2023] ZAWCHC 270 (2 November 2023)

The autonomy of educational institutions in conducting disciplinary proceedings within their established frameworks, the limited scope of judicial review in such contexts.

The case revolves around Theuns du Toit, a first-year LLB student at Stellenbosch University, who was involved in an incident that led to disciplinary action by the university's Central Disciplinary Committee (CDC) and subsequently, the Disciplinary Appeal Committee (DAC). The incident occurred in the early hours of May 15, 2022, at the university's residence known as "Huis Marais."

"In disciplinary proceedings, especially within academic institutions, the balance between procedural fairness and the autonomy of the institution to enforce its code of conduct is paramount. While courts are not arenas for re-evaluating the merits of disciplinary decisions made within these frameworks, they do ensure that the decision-making process adheres to the principles of legality, rationality, and fairness. This case underscores the importance of holding individuals accountable for their actions, particularly when those actions infringe upon the dignity and rights of others, while also affirming the limited scope of judicial intervention in the disciplinary processes of educational institutions."


Incident Details:
Du Toit allegedly entered the room of a fellow first-year student, Babalo Ndwayana, who resided on the first floor of the residence, around 4:00 AM while Ndwayana was asleep. Ndwayana was awakened by the noise of Du Toit moving around in his room. Upon turning on the light, Ndwayana observed Du Toit urinating on his desk and belongings, including a laptop lent by the university, textbooks, and notebooks.
Another student witnessed the incident and suggested Ndwayana record the act. During the recording, Ndwayana questioned Du Toit, who responded with remarks that were perceived as racist. Du Toit's comments included "waiting for someone, boy" and "It's a white boy thing," though the latter statement was made after the video recording had ended, according to Ndwayana.
Following the incident, Ndwayana reported the matter to the university authorities and the Student Representative Council (SRC), expressing that the act was a violation of his dignity and dehumanising.

Disciplinary Proceedings:
The university's CDC and DAC conducted hearings regarding the incident. Du Toit faced charges of trespassing, urination on property, and making a racist statement. Du Toit sought to have the findings and sanctions of the CDC and DAC reviewed and set aside by the High Court, arguing that his actions were due to severe intoxication and thus, he lacked the intent for the violations.
The CDC found Du Toit guilty of the charges and ordered his expulsion based on the severity of the misconduct, particularly underlining the racist nature of the remarks and the act of urination on Ndwayana's belongings.
The DAC upheld the CDC's findings and sanctions upon appeal, further reinforcing the decision to expel Du Toit from the university.

Legal Arguments and Court's Decision:
Du Toit's legal team argued that the disciplinary proceedings were flawed, citing bias, procedural unfairness, and errors of law, among other grounds for review under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA).
The court, however, dismissed the application for review, finding no substantial grounds to overturn the decisions of the CDC and DAC. The judgment underlined the distinction between review and appeal processes, noting that the disciplinary committees had not committed any material irregularities or errors that would warrant judicial intervention.
The court also addressed the issue of costs, applying principles from previous cases to determine that Du Toit should bear certain costs related to the proceedings, particularly those associated with challenges beyond his personal interest and the attempt to introduce new evidence without proper justification.

The case highlights the university's stance against racism and misconduct within its community, underscoring the importance of maintaining dignity and respect among students. The court's decision reaffirms the autonomy of educational institutions in disciplining students while also delineating the scope of judicial review in such disciplinary matters.

The core legal principle underlying the decision in this case, or the ratio decidendi, revolves around the distinction between the judicial review and appeal processes in the context of university disciplinary actions. Specifically, the court ruled that:

1. Review vs. Appeal: A court of review does not re-evaluate the evidence or substitute its own findings for those of the tribunal. Instead, it examines whether the decision-making process was lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair. The court highlighted that it is not within its purview to reassess the merits of the evidence or the correctness of the disciplinary committees' decisions, but rather to ensure that the decision was made within the bounds of the law and the established procedures.

2. Admissibility of Evidence in Disciplinary Proceedings: The court found that the disciplinary committees (CDC and DAC) were within their rights to consider the evidence presented, including unsworn statements and reports, as part of their fact-finding mission. This was based on the specific procedural framework and rules governing the university's disciplinary process, which do not require the same standards of evidence as a court of law. The court underscored that the disciplinary process is meant to be inquisitorial and not bound by the strict rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings.

3. Intoxication as a Defense: The court addressed the argument of intoxication affecting the intent and found that the disciplinary committees correctly considered the consequences of the applicant's voluntary intoxication in relation to his actions. The principle here is that self-induced intoxication does not absolve an individual from responsibility for their actions, especially when those actions violate the rights and dignity of others.

4. Fairness of the Disciplinary Process: The court concluded that the applicant was afforded a fair hearing within the permissible procedures of the university's disciplinary code. The court rejected claims of bias and procedural unfairness, noting that the applicant had the opportunity to present his case and that the disciplinary committees' decisions were based on a reasonable assessment of the evidence before them.

5. Costs in Constitutional and Administrative Matters: The court applied principles from prior cases (e.g., Biowatch and Harriella) regarding costs in constitutional and administrative matters, indicating that while unsuccessful litigants in constitutional challenges against the state are generally protected from adverse costs orders, exceptions exist for frivolous, vexatious, or manifestly inappropriate litigation. The court found that certain aspects of the applicant's challenge warranted censure and thus did not fully shield the applicant from costs.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case underscores the autonomy of educational institutions in conducting disciplinary proceedings within their established frameworks, the limited scope of judicial review in such contexts, and the principle that voluntary intoxication does not excuse misconduct that infringes on the rights and dignity of others.

In the reasoning process of the court, several key cases were referenced to support the legal principles and conclusions drawn. Here are some of the cases cited along with their neutral citations:

1. Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources [2009] ZACC 14; 2009 (6) SA 232 (CC); 2009 (10) BCLR 1014 (CC). This case was pivotal in establishing principles regarding costs orders in constitutional litigation, particularly the general rule that in litigation involving the assertion of constitutional rights against the state, the unsuccessful litigant should not be ordered to pay the state's costs.

2. Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [2005] ZACC 3; 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC); 2006 (10) BCLR 1255 (CC). This case was referenced for its discussion on exceptions to the general rule regarding costs in constitutional matters, highlighting circumstances under which a departure from the Biowatch principle may be justified, such as in cases of frivolous or vexatious litigation.

3. Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister in the Presidency and Others [2016] ZACC 30; 2017 (1) SA 645 (CC); 2017 (1) BCLR 1 (CC). This case further elaborated on the exceptions to the Biowatch principle regarding costs, finding that the principle is not a license for litigants to institute frivolous or vexatious proceedings against the state.

4. S v Makwanyane and Another [1995] ZACC 3; 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC). While not directly related to the procedural aspects of the case, this landmark decision on the abolition of the death penalty in South Africa was referenced for its profound discussion on the right to dignity under the South African Constitution.

5. South African Revenue Service v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others [2016] ZACC 38; 2017 (1) SA 549 (CC); 2017 (1) BCLR 38 (CC). This case was cited for its insights into handling allegations of racism and the importance of addressing racism with the seriousness it deserves.

These cases were instrumental in shaping the court's analysis and decision-making process, providing legal precedents and principles that guided the evaluation of the issues at hand, particularly regarding the scope of judicial review, the admissibility of evidence in disciplinary proceedings, the treatment of intoxication as a defense, and the application of costs in constitutional and administrative litigation.